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1.     Introduction 
e to a halt 
f the popular 
t BlackBerry’s 
rded damages 
atened to shut 
down BlackBerry email services if RIM did not pay royalties for the future use of NTP’s patents. 
006 RIM agreed to pay $612.5 million in a last minute settlement that averted the 
inju warded by the 
nt troll”.3 This 
 
to extort “excessive” royalties that are higher than the “fair share” dictated by the contribution of 
e “excessive” 
p. Because a 
ing” or “non-
ing entities).4 In 
ce a good on a 
ompetitors on the 
 
In early 2006 the email correspondence of millions of BlackBerry users nearly cam
when NTP, Inc. accused Research in Motion, Ltd. (“RIM”), the maker o
communication device, of infringing several of its patents.1 The court found tha
email retrieval system was indeed infringing on some of NTP’s patents and awa
and a permanent injunction against RIM. Armed with the injunction, NTP thre
In March 2
nction, an amount significantly more than the past damages of $33.5 million a
court.2 
This highly visible case is often quoted as an example of a so called “pate
term is used to describe a company that uses a patent to “hold-up” manufacturing companies and
its patent. Unfortunately, it is notoriously difficult to determine whether royalties ar
and to distinguish between aggressive (but legitimate) bargaining and hold-u
workable definition is lacking, patent trolls are often associated with “non-practic
manufacturing” patent holders (often referred to as NPEs, for non-practic
contrast to a vertically integrated firm (that both holds a patent and uses it to produ
downstream market), an NPE does not require cross licenses from c
                                                 
1
 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., No. 3:01-cv-767 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
2
 For a more detailed discussion of this case see Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent Hold-up and Roya
L. REV. 1991, 2009 (2007); James F. McDonoug
lty Stacking 85 TEX. 
h III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent 
Dealers in an Idea Economy 56 EMORY L. J. 189, 194-195 (2006). 
3
 The term “patent troll” was coined by Peter Detkin, former assistant general counsel for Intel, after Intel was sued for libel for its 
use of the term `patent extortionist´: “A patent troll is somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not 
practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced.”  McDonough III, supra note 2, at 192. Ian 
Austen and Lisa Guernsey, A Payday for Patents ‘R’ US, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2005.  
4
 See e.g. McDonough III, supra note 2, at 189; Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up and Patent Royalties 24 (Working Paper, 
2006), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/SHAPIRO/royalties.pdf; John M. Golden, "Patent Trolls" and Patent 
Remedies 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2112 (2007). As Lemley and Shapiro, supra note 2, 2009 put it: “Defining a patent troll has 
proven a tricky business, but that does not mean the problem does not exist. Nonpracticing entities file 30–40% of all patent suits 
in the computing and electronics industries, for example.” 
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downstream market. Therefore, so the argument goes, an NPE is not constrained in its behavior 
 entity. It does 
es or any other goods but owns a portfolio of patents that it licenses to 
man
es. In the US 
Supreme Court’s 2006 eBay v. MercExchange decision , Justice Kennedy  stated in his 
ction … can be 
ind Kennedy’s 
injunctive relief to non-
practicing patent holders. In fact, since 
regularly denying injunctive relief to non-manufacturing and non-competing firms.7  
 
tructure of the 
linear and non-
linear royalties, cross-licensing, patent pools). We show that an NPE does indeed have different 
pany. However, we argue that 
er rates. To the 
and may choose unjustifiably high royalty rates that are not in proper relation to the contribution 
of its patents. In the example of the Blackberry case, NTP, Inc. is a non-practicing
not produce cell phon
ufacturing companies.  
The identification of NPEs and patent trolls has important legal consequenc
5 6
concurring opinion that there are firms that “use patents not as a basis for producing and selling 
goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. For these firms, an injun
employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees”. The implied message beh
statement was that the lower courts should be careful in granting 
eBay v. MercExchange many district courts have been 
In this paper we challenge this legal practice. We analyze how patent holders choose their
royalties depending on their business model (vertically integrated or not), the s
upstream and downstream markets, and the type of licensing agreements feasible (
incentives regarding royalty rates than a vertically integrated com
there is no reason to presume that a non-integrated patent holder will charge high
                                                 
5
 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006). 
6
 Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. 
7
 See John L. Dauer Jr. and Sarah E. Cleffi, Trends In Injunctive Relief In Patent Cases Post-eBay THE METROPOLITAIN 
CORPORATE COUNSEL 16 (Feb. 2007): “… a survey of the cases decided since eBay proves useful in identifying one trend in the 
decisions. What has become apparent thus far is the district courts' attention to the considerations expressed in Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence and whether the parties are in direct competition. ... When the parties are not in direct competition, the courts … 
would likely find monetary damages are adequate. … To date, district courts appear to have thus far heeded Justice Kennedy's 
warnings in his eBay concurrence and not issued injunctions to such parties.” See also, Bernard H. Chao, eBay, Inc. V. 
Mercexchange: The Changing Landscape for Patent Remedies 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 543, 553 (2008) stating “…the 
existence of direct competition generally results in a permanent injunction. The converse is also true. Lack of direct competition 
generally results in the denial of a permanent injunction.”  
 4
contrary, we show that it is the vertically integrated firm that can have an incentive to raise its 
d for non-integrated patent holders. Thus, an integrated firm may charge 
high
aling with the 
ointed out that 
non-practicing patent holders can and do perform important and valuable functions in a market 
cting research 
panies.8 NPEs 
e downstream 
tradable by patenting and licensing.  Other NPEs can act as intermediaries, buying and selling 
arkets.10 This literature 
esta  is clearly not 
s may have an 
r which a hold-up 
unaware of the 
 the investment is sunk 
                                           
royalties in order to raise its rivals’ costs and to restrict entry on the downstream market, neither 
of which motivations hol
er royalties than an NPE.  
There are a few recent papers in the law and economics literature de
problem of patent trolls and non-practicing patent holders. Several authors have p
economy. Many NPEs, including universities, government sponsored research labs, and some 
high technology companies, specialize on their comparative advantage of condu
and development while leaving the manufacturing of final products to other com
can also foster the dissemination of new technologies and encourage entry on th
market because their primary, if not only, source of revenue relies on making their innovations 
9
patents to provide liquidity and increased efficiency to technology m
blishes that a general condemnation of non-practicing patent holders as “trolls”
warranted. However, none of these papers addresses the question of whether NPE
incentive to charge higher royalties than vertically integrated firms. 
In a seminal paper, Shapiro11 identifies two sets of conditions unde
problem may give rise to patent troll behavior. First, the manufacturing firm is 
patent when it invests in the production of its product. In this case, after
      
8
 Motivated by the example of universities, Lemley refines the definition of a patent troll. He argues that universities are not 
patent trolls because they are actively engaged in technology transfer, while patent trolls are non-manufacturing entities that do 
not engage in technology transfer but instead license only the right not to be sued. However, Lemley concedes that this definition 
is too abstract and could easily be gamed if applied by the courts. See Mark Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls? 19 (Stanford 
Public Law Working Paper No. 980776, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=980776.  
9
 See Damien Gerardin, Anne Layne-Farrar, and Jorge Padilla, Elves or Trolls? The Role of Non-Practicing Patent Owners in the 
Innovation Economy, (TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2008-018, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1136086. 
10
 See McDonough III, supra note 2. 
11
 Shapiro, supra note 4. See also Lemley and Shapiro, supra note 2, for a more detailled discussion of the implications of this 
model. 
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the patent holder can extort supra-normal royalties by threatening to obtain an injunction and shut 
robability that 
hapiro’s model 
and wait for a 
bove, or it can 
threaten to invent around the patent, such that negotiations with the patent holder are based on the 
assum
nd seem to fit 
ction between 
 a hold-up problem as described by 
Shapiro’s model arises, a non-practicing and a vertically integrated patent holder both have the 
erent types of 
 each of whom 
.
12
  All parties 
f all patents and their validity is not in dispute. Thus there is no hold-up problem 
ower because he 
unwilling to accept 
                                                
down production of the entire product. Second, the manufacturing firm is aware of the patent 
before it invests in the production of its product, but the patent is “weak”, i.e. the p
it will be declared valid by a court is considerably smaller than one. In this case S
assumes that the manufacturing firm can either start production without a license 
decision of the court, facing the same sunk cost hold-up problem as described a
ption that the patent is valid with certainty. In both cases the patent holder will get supra-
normal royalties. 
The cases considered by Shapiro are illustrations of the hold-up problem a
the stylized facts of the Blackberry case, but they have nothing to do with the distin
non-practicing and vertically integrated patent holders. If
exact same incentive to exploit it.   
We consider a set-up that allows for different market structures and diff
licensing contracts. On the upstream market there are one or several patent holders
has at least one patent that is essential for the production of the downstream good
are aware o
stemming from weak patents,13 but each patent holder has considerable market p
can threaten to interrupt downstream production if the downstream firms are 
his royalties.  
 
12
 We restrict our attention to the case in which the patents at issue are essential for downstream production, so there are no 
feasible substitutes. This is the most suitable case for our purposes since the presence of viable substitutes prevents hold-up. If 
there are imperfect but viable substitutes for the patent upstream, the analysis is more complicated. For an analysis of the welfare 
effects of patent pools when not all patents are essential, see Daniel Quint, Economics of Patent Pools when Some (but not All) 
Patents Are Essential (SIEPR Discussion Paper 06-028, 2008), available at, http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~dquint/papers/patent-
pools-quint.pdf. 
13
 We find this form of hold-up far less plausible since licensees can and do challenge the validity of a patent and need not 
negotiate as if the patent were valid and infringed. 
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Standard models of oligopolistic competition suggest that there are two effects that may 
e downstream 
nt holder does 
 profits of the 
is called the 
“complements effect”.  In the recent IP literature, the complements problem has gained the new 
 form a large 
h effects may result in a cumulative royalty rate that 
is h onopolist who 
business model (vertically integrated or not) and the structure of the upstream and downstream 
inatory 
uble mark-up 
hich leads to 
ent of a DVD 
ed royalty rate 
for the patent may be higher than it would be if the manufacturer also held the patent (i.e., had 
e a profit margin 
 firm a single profit margin suffices. However, there is a second effect 
that goes in the opposite direction. If a vertically integrated firm raises its royalty rate, it does not 
                                                
induce firms to charge excessive royalties: First, when upstream patent holders choose their 
royalties they do not take into account that higher royalties reduce the profits of th
firms. This is the well known “double mark-up effect”. Second, an upstream pate
not take into account that if he raises the royalty rate for his patent he reduces the
other patent holders, because the patents are perfect complements. This 
14
moniker of “royalty stacking” because the many firms’ royalty rates stack up to
cumulative burden for manufacturers.15 Bot
igher than the royalty rate chosen by a fully integrated monopolist (i.e. a m
owns all essential patents and all downstream firms). 
In Section 2 we analyze how patent holders choose their royalties depending on their 
markets if all firms act non-cooperatively and set individual linear and non-discrim
royalties. It is well known that vertical integration eliminates the vertical do
problem within the vertically integrated firm (but not across firm boundaries), w
lower royalties. So, for example, if the firm that holds a patent on an essential elem
player is separate from the firm that manufactures the DVD player, then the impli
integrated R&D and manufacturing) because the two separate firms both requir
whereas for an integrated
 
14
 Both effects have been first described by Auguste A. Cournot,  RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 
THEORY OF WEALTH,  New York: Kelly  1971 (English edition of RESEARCHES SUR LE PRINCIPLES MATHEMATIQUESDE LA THEORIE 
DES RICHESSES,  Paris 1838). 
15
 See Lemley and Shapiro, supra note 2. 
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affect its own cost of production –– the higher royalty is a cost of manufacture but also a source 
am rivals the 
 and its profits. In the presence 
of th
licensing agreements or patent pools. If firms set royalties jointly through patent pooling, an 
ark-up/royalty 
where royalties 
ally integrated 
l double mark-
s can charge 
discriminatory royalties, they have a strong incentive to charge prohibitively high royalties to 
petition. Non-
m competition 
 show that if 
l  integrated firms and non-integrated upstream firms agree to pool their patents and share 
prof higher than the 
ones charged by the integrated company, because the upstream firm has to make all of its profits 
lysis to the case where patent holders can charge non-linear 
royalties. When firms are non-integrated, upstream firms can use non-linear royalty schemes to 
                                                
of revenue for the upstream division –– but that higher royalty does raise the costs of its 
competitors on the downstream market. By raising the costs of its downstre
vertically integrated firm can increase its downstream market share
ese two countervailing forces, the overall effect on royalties is ambiguous. 
In Section 3 we allow for coordinated royalty setting on the upstream market, i.e. cross-
association of companies will internalize the effects of horizontal double m
stacking and therefore may reduce aggregate royalties as compared to a situation 
are set non-cooperatively. If such an association were comprised solely of vertic
firms, and thus included cross-licensing agreements, it could solve both the vertica
up and the horizontal complements problems. However, if vertically integrated firm
non-integrated downstream producers in order to reduce downstream com
integrated patent holders, on the other hand, benefit from vigorous downstrea
because it tends to expand sales and lead to more royalty payments. We also
vertica ly
its equally, the royalties charged by the non-integrated upstream firm must be 
upstream.16 
In Section 4 we extend the ana
 
16
 Note that this finding is consistent with the findings reported in Aoki and Nagaoka, who observe that “there should be extra 
distribution to research firms [within the pool] to compensate for the lack of production profits.” Reiko Aoki and Sadao Nagaoka, 
The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools 17 (HISTAT Discussion Paper 32, 2004), available at, www.ier.hit-
u.ac.jp/pie/Japanese/discussionpaper/dp2004/dp222/text.pdf. 
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eliminate any vertical and horizontal distortions, just as the vertically integrated firms do. 
 to raise their rivals’ costs and to use 
thei
e impact their 
 royalties than 
rges excessive 
royalties depends on whether there is scope for hold-up, either because of sunk investments or 
 
ertically integrated or not. Unfortunately, this result implies that the 
search goes on for readily identifiable characteristics that can objectively indicate a patent troll in 
is based on a 
nologies to be 
duce the good 
panies. Thus, 
each firm that produces the good requires a license from each of the patent holders. We call the 
market for licenses the “technology” or “upstream market” and the market for the good (e.g., the 
s may be 
vertically integrated in that they hold an essential patent and produce the final good. Other 
companies may be non-integrated: either they hold a patent but do not use it to produce the final 
good themselves, or they produce the final good but do not hold any essential patents. We call 
these non-integrated companies upstream and downstream firms, respectively. To fix ideas, we 
Vertically integrated firms, however, still have an incentive
r royalties to force downstream competitors to exit the market.  
These results show that non-integrated companies are constrained by th
behavior has on the downstream market and in some cases they may charge lower
their vertically integrated counterparts. We conclude that whether a company cha
because of weak patents (coupled with high litigation costs). These factors are orthogonal to
whether patent holders are v
advance of any hold-up behavior.  
2.  Complements, Double Mark-Ups, and Raising One’s Rivals’ Costs 
Consider a high technology good such as a cell phone or a DVD player that 
technological standard requiring the use of a number of different patented tech
operational. Each of the patents is essential in the sense that no firm can legally pro
without access to the patent. The essential patents are often owned by different com
cell phone or the DVD player) the “product” or “downstream market”. Some firm
 9
assume that each company on the upstream market owns exactly one essential patent and that all 
 downstream market have the same cost functions and produce end goods that are 
substitutes. 
ally integrated 
s are restricted 
eal world 
licensing contracts can be explained by asymmetries of information between the licensee and the 
18 ten explicitly 
 as RAND, or 
n-discriminatory licensing). In Section 4 we extend the analysis to the case 
whe een different 
 What royalties will be charged by a vertically integrated vs. a non-integrated patent 
at there are 
 non-integrated 
pate egrated patent 
ertheless, it is 
tive importance. 
is required for 
ll charge a royalty 
                                                
firms on the
 The focus of our analysis is on the royalties that will be charged by vertic
and non-integrated patent holders. In this section we assume that all patent holder
to using linear, non-discriminatory royalties.17 The prevalence of linear royalty rates in r
licensor and their risk-sharing properties.  Non-discriminatory royalties are of
noted in contracts and are a common commitment made in standard setting (known
reasonable and no
re firms can use two-part tariffs and where they can discriminate betw
downstream producers. 
holder? The answer to this question depends on the market structure. It turns out th
several effects that have opposing impacts on vertically integrated as compared to
nt holders. We will show that, in general, it is ambiguous whether a non-int
holder charges higher or lower royalties than a vertically integrated firm. Nev
highly instructive to understand the different effects in order to evaluate their rela
 Consider a non-integrated upstream firm owning one patent that 
downstream production. This patent holder has a monopoly on its patent and wi
 
17
 In other words, for now we assume straight forward royalty rates comprise the license payment; non-linear royalty schedules 
and lump sum fees are not used. 
18
 If there are asymmetries of information, linear royalties can be used as optimal screening or signalling devices.  For a 
discussion of optimal screening see A. W. Beggs, The Licensing of Patents under Asymmetric Information 10 INT’L J. INDUS. 
ORG.171 (1992); for a discussion of signaling devices see Nancy T Gallini and Brian D Wright, Technology Transfer under 
Asymmetric Information 21 RAND J. ECON. 147 (1998). Choi shows that linear royalties are optimal when there is moral hazard. 
Jay P. Choi, Technology Transfer with Moral Hazard 19 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG.249 (2001).Bouquet et al. characterize licensing 
agreements with optimal risk sharing properties. Alain Bousquet, Helmuth Cremer, Marc Ivaldi, and Michel Wolkowicz, Risk 
Sharing in Licensing 16 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG.535 (1998).  
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that maximizes profits. If the patent holder increases its royalty rate, it will increase the marginal 
rtially19) pass 
crease and the 
e monopolistic 
 rate raises its 
re (essentially) 
zero for patent licensing, the patent holder will raise its royalties to the point that a one percent 
increase in the royalty rate yields a one percent decrease in the quantity sold. This is just the 
standard monopoly profit maximization problem as applied to patent licensing. 
eral additional 
o are active in 
arket. 
Recall that all patents are perfect complements: each of them is essential for producing the final 
ts is 
required. If one patent holder rais
This is the so 
 the downstream market. If 
ess than one. Thus, 
prices reduces the 
                                                
cost that each downstream firm has to incur. Downstream firms will (at least pa
through this cost increase to their customers. Thus, downstream prices will in
quantity of the final good sold on the downstream market will decrease. When th
patent holder chooses its royalty rate, it takes into account that a higher royalty
profit on each unit but lowers the number of units sold. Because marginal costs a
 However, in contrast to the standard monopoly problem, there are sev
externalities that the monopolistic patent holder imposes on other producers wh
these markets. First, there is an external effect on the other patent holders in the upstream m
good, so for each unit sold on the downstream market exactly one license of each of the paten
es its royalty and thereby reduces the total quantity of the final 
good sold downstream, it reduces the revenues of all the other patent holders.  
called “complements problem” that was first described by Cournot.20  
 Second, there is an external effect on the firms producing on
the downstream market is not perfectly competitive, the pass through rate is l
the portion of the increase in the royalty rate that is not passed through to end 
 
19
 The pass-through rate may be larger than 1, for example in the case of a constant elasticity demand function. 
20
 In a famous example, Cournot, supra note 14,  considered two monopolists, one controlling copper, the other zinc, both selling 
to the competitive brass industry. The production of brass requires copper and zinc in fixed proportions. Thus, if the copper 
monopolist increases his price, the production of brass is reduced, which imposes a negative external effect on the zinc 
monopolist who now also sells less.  See also Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior,in  1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 329, 339, (Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig eds., 1989) for a more detailed discussion. In another paper 
Shapiro extends this analysis to the case of complementary patents. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross 
Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1,4-5 (Adam Jaffe et. al. eds, 2001). 
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profits of the downstream firms by reducing their margins, and the portion of the royalty rate 
. 
double mark-up problem” that arises between two vertically related firms 
that
royalties above 
cooperatively, then the sum of all royalties would be higher than the total royalties charged by a 
 all the essential patents and all 
downstream firm  and 
tegration. In a 
simple chain of monopolies, vertical integration eliminates the double mark-up problem. 
However, in a more complicated world with several upstream and downstream firms, vertical 
ream and one 
ntegrated firm 
ream division. 
, with vertical 
rate the vertically integrated firm raises the costs of its downstream competitors without raising 
its own cost. Note that the royalty rate of its own downstream division is just an internal transfer 
payment that shifts profits from the downstream to the upstream division but leaves total firm 
profits unaffected. Thus, by raising the marginal costs of its rivals the integrated firm gains a 
increase that is passed through to end prices reduces the quantities that they can sell downstream
This is the well known “
 both have market power. 
 Both the complements effect and the double mark-up effect tend to raise 
their optimal level. In fact, if all patent holders set their royalty rates independently and non-
fully integrated monopolist, i.e. a monopolist who owns
s. In this case, not only consumers, but also firms on the upstream
downstream markets would benefit if total royalties were lower.  
 A well known remedy to mitigate the double mark-up problem is vertical in
integration need not improve social welfare. To see this, suppose that one upst
downstream firm vertically integrate. When the upstream division of this i
increases its royalty rate, it fully internalizes the effect on the profits of its downst
This mitigates the double mark-up problem within the integrated firm. However
integration there is a new strategic effect pointing in the opposite direction. By raising its royalty 
 12
competitive advantage, pushes its rivals’ prices higher, and as a result gains a higher market share 
downstream for the sale of its own good.21  
ation. A non-
pstream patent 
rket entry, and 
 makes 
part (or most) of its profits on the downstream market. Therefore it wants this market to be less 
ose market entry, and it will use the royalty rate for the patent of its 
upstream
er and a large 
number N of potential downstream firms with identical cost functions that compete in quantities 
on the downstream market. Suppose that a Cournot equilibrium exists on the downstream market 
for any royalty rate r>0 charged by the upstream monopolist.22 We do not have to impose any 
atent holder is non-
he monopolistic 
 The source of this “raising one’s rival’s costs effect” is vertical integr
integrated patent holder does not participate in downstream profits. Thus an u
holder benefits if the downstream market becomes more competitive, if there is ma
if more units of the final good are sold as a result. In contrast, a vertically integrated firm
competitive, it will opp
 division to achieve an advantage over rival downstream firms that do not hold patents 
for cross licensing.  
 To illustrate this point suppose that there is just one upstream patent hold
other assumptions on the cost and demand functions. Suppose first that the p
integrated and not active on the downstream market. In this case it will charge t
                                                 
21
 The raising one’s rivals’ costs effect has first been described by Salop and Scheffman. See Steven C. Salop 
Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs 37 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983); Steven C. Salop and David T. Scheffman
Strategies 36 J. I . E . 19 (1987). H
and David T. 
, Cost-Raising 
 average 
eclose the market or 
to Ordover, Saloner 
 m ated products. Their 
ced upstr  are perfect look at the 
 integrated firm must be able to commit ex ante to a price for the 
input good, even though there is an incentive to reduce this price ex post. No such commitment is necessary in our analysis. 
Janusz Ordover, Garth Saloner, and Steven C. Salop, Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure 80 AM. ECON. REV. 127 (1990). Kim 
analyses a model similar to ours, but he restricts attention to the case of a linear demand curve. Sung H. Kim, Vertical Structure 
and Patent Pools 25 REV. INDUS. ORG. 231 (2004). 
22
 That is, an equilibrium where firms compete on quantities supplied and the equilibrium price is determined by the sum of these 
quantities. Novshek offers a set of fairly weak sufficient conditions that guarantee existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in 
the Cournot model. He requires that there exists a
 NDUS  CON owever, they restrict attention to a dominant firm that can affect marginal and
costs of a competitive fringe. They show that the dominant firm will raise its rivals’ cost in order to either for
to induce competitors to raise their prices and to relax competition. The situation we are interested in is closer 
and Salop, and Kim. Ordover et al. consider a two-stage duopoly odel with price competition and differenti
model looks at the more conventional case where the goods produ eam  substitutes while we 
opposite case of perfect complements. In their model a vertically
 Q  such that for all ( ) 0P Q ! Q Q  and that ( ) 0P Q  for all Q Q! , and that is 
twice continuously differentiable with for all 
 ( )P Q
'( ) 0P Q  Q Q . Furthermore, '( ) ''( ) 0P Q q P Q   for all 0 q Q Qd d d . See William Novshek, 
On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium 52 REV. ECON STUD. 85 (1985). 
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royalty rate r >0 that maximizes profits given the Cournot equilibrium on the downstream 
ark-up 
 higher are the 
ally integrates 
rge a 
 thus forced to 
exit the market. Note that the downstream division of the integrated firm is not affected by the 
at has 
tream division 
lty rate to a 
am firms and 
 market. Because profits are maximized by a fully integrated 
mon tegy is indeed 
optimal.   
 has a natural 
e the profits it 
ms are not all 
the downstream division of the integrated firm, then the integrated firm will not want to 
 from the market.  The reason is that the 
presence of other (differentiated) downstream firms extends the market and thus increases the 
royalty income of the upstream division. However, it is still the case that the integrated firm 
                                                
M
market. The larger N, the more competitive the downstream market, the smaller is the m
charged by the downstream firms, the greater is the volume of goods sold, and the
profits of the patent holder. Suppose now that the upstream patent holder vertic
with one of the downstream firms. One possible strategy of the integrated firm is to cha
royalty rate that is so high that no other downstream firm can make a profit and are
rate increase, because within the integrated firm the royalty rate is a mere transfer price th
no effect on overall firm profits: each dollar spent on higher royalties by the downs
is a dollar of revenues for the upstream division. Thus, by raising its roya
prohibitively high level, the integrated firm can foreclose all other downstre
monopolize the downstream
opolist (who controls both the upstream and the downstream market) this stra
23
 The point of this extreme example is to show that a vertically integrated firm
inclination to use its royalty rate to raise the costs of its rivals in order to increas
makes on the downstream market. It can be shown that if the downstream fir
identical, but instead sell sufficiently differentiated products or have lower marginal costs than 
completely shut out all of its downstream rivals 24
 
23
 And has thus been a real world problem. See, e.g., Case T-5/97, Industrie des Poudres Spheriqques SA v Commission, E.R.C. 
II-3755; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
24
 See also X.H. Wang and B.Z. Yang, On Licensing under Bertrand Competition, AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS 38 (1999) for a 
similar result with Bertrand competition.   
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charges a royalty rate that discriminates against its downstream rivals and that may be higher than 
ted upstream firm would have chosen for otherwise identical 
circumstances and patented technology. 
an incentive to 
 gives rise to a 
charge lower royalties, but for each firm it is optimal to charge high royalties. In the next section 
we will see that cross-licensing agreements or patent pools can be used to solve this prisoners’ 
e. On the one 
 upstream and 
downstream divisions, which tends to improve efficiency. On the other hand, the “raising one’s 
rivals’ cost effect” tends to raise royalties and to reduce efficiency. Which of the two effects 
hmidt25 shows 
d downstream 
 all firms are 
et in which all 
demand and cost functions and identical firms, Kim26 shows that if the number of vertically 
rium price on the 
downstream market that is strictly higher than the equilibrium price that obtains under non-
                                                
the royalty rate that a non-integra
 If there are several vertically integrated upstream firms, each of them has 
raise the costs of the other vertically integrated firms by raising its royalties. This
prisoners’ dilemma. All vertically integrated upstream firms would be better off if they would all 
dilemma, although they do not necessarily solve the problem of raising rivals’ costs. 
 We conclude that vertical integration has two effects on the market outcom
hand, vertically integrated firms internalize the double mark-up effect between
dominates depends on the specific structure of the cost and demand functions. Sc
in a much more general model, with arbitrarily many firms on the upstream an
markets and a general model of downstream competition, that a market in which
vertically integrated may give rise to higher or lower total royalties than a mark
firms are non-integrated. For the special but natural example of Cournot competition with linear 
integrated firms is not too large, then vertical integration induces an equilib
 
25
 Klaus M. Schmidt, Complementary Patents and Market Structure (CEPR Discussion Paper Series, No. 7005), available at 
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=7005. 
26
 Kim, supra note 21, Theorem 3. 
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integration. Thus, vertical integration may well reduce total output, total industry profit, and 
social welfare. 
r royalty rates 
independently and non-cooperatively. However, it is quite common that firms coordinate their 
behavior through bilateral cross-licensing agreements. Moreover, within standard setting contexts 
 of firms with 
ance, many of 
r development 
ls are under 
development for mobile telecom standards.  Such cross-licensing and pooling agreements are 
often reciprocal. Each firm agrees to a low royalty rate for its own patents as long as the other 
firms involved in the agreement also charge a low royalty rate.  
argely the case 
ments and the 
 with a set of 
cross-licensing agreements. If the firms are symmetric, they will charge symmetric royalty rates. 
here are no net 
f downstream specialists 
                                                
 
3.  Pooling Agreements 
So far we have assumed that all firms active on the upstream market choose thei
it is becoming more common for at least some patent holders among a group
complementary patents to coordinate their licensing through patent pools. For inst
the video and audio MPEG standards already involve patent pools, a pool is unde
for RFID (radio frequency identification) standards, and a number of poo
27
 In this section we show that if all firms are vertically integrated –– as was l
within standard setting in past decades –– it is indeed possible to solve the comple
double mark-up problem and to sustain the fully integrated monopoly outcome
Because everything is symmetric, the royalty payments just cancel out and t
payments in equilibrium for other vertically integrated firms. However, i
 
27
 See Press Release, Via Licensing Corporation, Via Licensing Announces Progress Toward Establishing AVC License Terms 
(Oct. 15, 2003), available at http://www.vialicensing.com/news/details.cfm?VIANEWS_ID=309; Sabra Chartrand, The Federal 
Government Will Allow a Group of Companies to Unify Administration of 27 Patent, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1997; Olga Kharif, The 
RFID Patent Pool: Will It Make Waves?, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 11, 2006. ADD CITE FOR CDMA-2000 and LTE. 
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are present in the market (such as, for example, semiconductor chip fabricators that are not active 
in chip design), the problem of raising rivals’ costs returns.  
ehavior is not 
n into a patent 
cross-licensing 
lly integrated 
firms and charge excessively high royalties. However, this argument misses the mark. We show 
 with a pooling 
example, these 
 firms 
 the upstream 
tegrated firms 
make their profits both upstream and downstream and tend to prefer lower royalties that shift 
profits downstream. If all (integrated and non-integrated) patent holders want to split profits 
there are N2 
licensing agreements according to which each firm charges each other firm the royalty r0 for 
using its patent. Thus, the total royalty that each firm has to pay for each unit of the final good it 
sells on the downstream market is equal to sum of rival upstream firm royalty rates, which (given 
the symmetry assumed) amounts to multiplying the royalty rate r by the number of rivals: R=(N-
1)r. Let 
 It is sometimes argued that because a non-integrated patent holder’s b
restricted by the need to get cross licenses from fellow patent holders, it will tur
troll charging unjustifiably high royalties. Without the constraint that reciprocal 
imposes, so the argument goes, non-integrated patent holders will hold up vertica
that it is also possible to solve the complements and the double mark-up problem
agreement even if some upstream firms are non-integrated (keeping with the chip 
firms would be the design-only shops, with no manufacturing plants). However, in this case
are no longer symmetric. The non-integrated patent holders make their profits on
market only and must insist on charging relatively higher royalties, while the in
equally, then the non-integrated patent holders must charge higher royalties than the integrated 
firms.  
 To make these arguments more precise, let us start with the case where 
symmetric and vertically integrated companies. Suppose that these firms negotiate a set of cross-
*R  denote the total royalty payment that induces each firm to produce 1/N of the 
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* * / ( 1)r r R N  monopoly output on the downstream market. If the firms choose , then, given 
ents, each firm will produ
it. Thus, if all 
and the double 
onopoly firm. 
sing ag ents prevent the f  raising their (vertically 
integ
rmed by the N 
regarded as an 
rge each other 
 to charge the 
monopoly price. But, as we have just seen, this price is lower than the price that would obtain if 
firms did not coordinate their behavior. The reason is of course the complements problem. There 
are N monopolists upstream. If they do not coordinate their behavior each will try to exploit his 
d by a fully 
ome. But, the 
monopoly is based on the IP rights of the patent holders. These rights have been granted to 
reward them  
monopolizes his invention on his own, thereby imposing negative externalities on everybody 
else, but patent holders instead coordinate their behavior so as to make everyone better off.  
 Nevertheless, antitrust authorities have tended to view patent pools that fix input prices 
with great suspicion, while they are generally much less skeptical about bilateral, reciprocal cross 
the set of cross-licensing agreem ce 1/ N  of the monopoly quantity 
downstream and each firm will earn 1/ N  of the fully integrated monopoly prof
vertically integrated firms agree to charge the same royalty *r  the complements 
mark-up problems disappear, just as if the firms had literally merged into a single m
Furthermore, the cross licen reem irms from
rated) rivals’ costs.  
 The above example can be seen as a patent pool. Note that such a pool fo
vertically integrated firms is an agreement that fixes input prices. This could be 
illegal cartel by antitrust authorities. In fact, the vertically integrated firms cha
royalties that are passed through to consumers and induce downstream divisions
monopoly power and total royalties will be even higher than the royalty charge
integrated monopolist.  
 To be sure, the outcome established by the patent pool is a monopoly outc
 for their innovations. The patent pool makes sure that none of the patent holders
 18
licensing agreements.   However, in terms of economic effects there is not much difference 
librium if only 
re, two firms i 
 to be optimal 
how that if all 
firms bilaterally agree to charge each other r*, then no pair of firms has an incentive to deviate 
ong themselves.29 Thus, the patent pool outcome can 
also obtain as an equilibrium outcome if firms are constrained to write bilateral cross-licensing 
non-integrated 
scenario, where the more traditional large vertically integrated firms compete with both up- and 
ost 
l the vertically 
integrated firms will charge the low reciprocal royalty rate r* only among themselves but a 
higher royalty rate r > r* to their non-integrated downstream competitors. Part of the increased 
cross license,30 which 
28
between a patent pool and bilateral cross licensing agreements. In the appendix we show, for the 
example of a linear Cournot game, that the same outcome can be sustained in equi
bilateral cross-licensing agreements are feasible, rather than a full fledged pool. He
and j agree to a reciprocal royalty rate among themselves. This royalty rate has
given the royalty rates that all other pairs of firms have already agreed to. We s
and to agree to a different royalty rate am
agreements. 
 If, in addition to the N vertically integrated firms, there are some 
downstream firms, the double mark-up and the raising one’s rivals’ cost effects reappear. This 
downstream specialists, is the best description of the composition of firms participating in m
cooperative standard setting bodies today. In this common case, under our mode
royalty rate is due to the downstream specialists’ lack of patents to offer in 
                                                 
28U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION (2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf.; Commission Notice,  
Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology Transfer Agreements, 2004 O.J. (C 1001/2). See also 
Richard Schmalensee, STANDARD SETTING, INNOVATION SPECIALISTS AND COMPETITION POLICY, mimeo 2009, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1219784, who argues that antitrust policy should not allow or encourage collective negotiation of patent 
royalty rates. 
29
 This equilibrium need not be unique. However, even if there are multiple equilibria, the equilibrium that implements the 
monopoly outcome maximizes total surplus of all firms and is a natural focal point. 
30
 For a general introduction to the interaction between contract terms see Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant, THE 
ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS: THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS (2002). 
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eliminates a payment in kind. Some portion of the increase, however, is set in order to 
discriminate against the non-integrated downstream rivals. 
are also some 
plements and 
e total royalty 
 
will again produce 1/N of the monopoly output, just as before. However, the non-integrated 
of their profits 
ely entirely on 
rtion of their 
it royalty rate 
sought. For these reasons non-integrated patent holders tend to ask for higher royalties than 
vertically integrated firms. In particular, if all firms have the same bargaining power and agree to 
they are active 
grated firms 
prefer a royalty rate r that is somewhat smaller than the royalty rate r* = R*/(M+N-1) that 
 total industry profits, but it does so at the 
expense of the non-integrated upstream firms, while the vertically integrated firms benefit from 
the lower downstream costs. On the other hand, the non-integrated upstream firms prefer a 
royalty rate that is somewhat higher than the monopoly rate  r*= R*/(M+N-1), because they want 
to shift profits from the downstream to the upstream market.  
 What happens if in addition to the N vertically integrated firms there 
number M>0 of non-integrated patent holders? Is it still possible to solve the com
the double mark-up problem with a multi-lateral cross-licensing agreement? If th
rate that each downstream division has to pay equals the sum set before, that is R*, then each firm
patent holders have no interest in cross-licensing agreements because they do not require a 
license for the other patents. Furthermore, note that the integrated firms make part 
upstream and part of them downstream, while the non-integrated patent holders r
their royalty income. Finally, vertically integrated firms can also accept a po
upstream payment in the form of a cross license, which tends to reduce the explic
share profits equally, the non-integrated patent holders must get a higher royalty rate than the 
vertically integrated firms.  
 If firms were constrained to charge equal royalties independent of whether 
on the downstream market or not, a conflict of interest would arise. Vertically inte
implements the monopoly outcome. This lowers
 20
   
4.  Non-linear and Discriminatory Royalties 
 part tariff is a 
alty rate based 
 where the 
upfront fee reflects the agreed upon value of the patented technology while the running royalty 
, the ability to 
dules of this sort does not change the analysis. The parties can 
ented and then 
Non-linear royalties are more interesting if firms have to set their rates independently and 
non-cooperatively, as is often the case in standard setting bodies.  the following analysis we 
n. To see this, 
Firms may also use non-linear royalty schemes, such as two-part tariffs. A two-
license with an upfront lump sum fee paid in conjunction with a linear running roy
on sales spread over a specified time period. Such licenses are common in practice,
shares the risk over any remaining uncertainty regarding the commercial success of the product 
employing the patented technology. If cross-licensing agreements can be written
employ non-linear payment sche
set the linear portion of the royalties such that the monopoly outcome is implem
use the fixed fees to redistribute profits. 
In
show that if all firms are non-integrated, the monopoly outcome will still obtai
suppose that each non-integrated upstream patent holder u, 1,...,u N , makes a ta
it offer of a two-part tariff consisting of a fixed fee u
ke-it-or-leave-
R and a linear royalty rate ur .
31
 The first step 
of the argument is to show that all of the non-integrated downstream firms must make zero 
 firms make an 
aise its fixed fee 
                                                
economic profits in equilibrium.32 Suppose to the contrary that downstream
economic profit that is strictly positive.  Then an upstream patent holder could r
 
31
 The combination of take-it-or-leave-it offers and two-part tariffs implies that upstream patent holders have all the bargaining 
power and that downstream firms do not get any rents. If we allow for a more complex bargaining procedure that gives some 
bargaining power to downstream firms, this extreme result disappears. However, all the qualitative results described below still 
hold. 
32
 Recall that accounting profits are very different from economic profits, which account for opportunity costs in addition to costs 
of production. Zero economic profits simply indicate a competitive market, where downstream firms do not earn anything above 
the competitive return for their production investments. 
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Ru in order to capture this profit for itself, without affecting the downstream firm’s decision to 
-negative, the 
other upstream 
n incentive to 
ofits. Thus, in 
 Note that this 
extreme outcome is due to the fact that the upstream firms provide all of the IP while the 
m firm controls an input 
factor that increases the value of the downstream good (such as a brand name, for example) its 
r.  
efficiently, i.e. 
 firms. To see 
this suppose that the sum of the linear royalties is higher than the royalty rate that implements the 
 literature.33 If 
 holder u could 
higher than a 
t holder can 
u  in total profits 
for itself, leaving the downstream firms with zero economic profits, as just described above. 
Thus, if the sum of the linear royalties does not lead to the monopoly outcome, each upstream 
firm has an incentive to change its royalty structure in order to obtain the resulting increase in 
profits through an increase of the fixed fee. There is a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in 
which all patent holders charge the same linear royalties and fixed fees such that the sum of the 
                                                
continue participating in the market. As long as economic profits are non
downstream firm will stay in the market. In fact, if the sum of the fixed fees of the 
firms leaves any profit for the downstream firms, then each upstream firm has a
further raise its fixed fee until all downstream firms make zero economic pr
equilibrium upstream firms will extract the entire surplus from downstream firms.
downstream firms are solely responsible for assembly. If a downstrea
bargaining power would be stronger and the allocation of profits would surely diffe
The second step of the argument is to show that linear royalties will be set 
so as to maximize the downstream profits that can then be captured by the upstream
monopoly price. This circumstance has been described as “royalty stacking” in the
rates were to stack to a level higher than the monopolistic rate, the upstream patent
reduce its royalty rate ru, which would increase total profits, because rates 
monopolist’s yield strictly smaller profits for the patent holder. The paten
simultaneously increase its fixed fee R  as a means of capturing the entire increase
 
33
 See Lemley and Shapiro, supra note 2. 
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linear royalties implements the monopoly outcome and the sum of the fixed fees captures all the 
ark-up and the 
non-integrated 
used, we get the same outcome that obtains with a patent pool even if 
 – an unlikely 
scenario. Today, most complex industries, where the complements and double mark-up problems 
 non-integrated 
bed above no 
 the other non-
l patent holder 
, suppose that 
there is an equilibrium in which all firms charge symmetric fees and royalties (r,R). First of all, it 
stream market. 
ut if fees and 
rated firms are 
egrated firm i 
 affect firm i’s 
own costs, but it does raise the costs of its downstream rivals. As a result, some other firms will 
now decide not to buy the licenses at all and to produce a quantity of zero – all to the benefit of 
firm . Therefore, firm  has an incentive to deviate from the proposed equilibrium candidate. 
Thus, we conclude that the “raising rivals’ costs” effect implies that a symmetric, pure strategy 
equilibrium does not exist when both integrated and non-integrated firms are present.   
downstream profits. Thus, with the flexibility of two-part tariffs both the double m
complements problem (royalty stacking) disappear. To summarize, if all firms are 
and two-part tariffs can be 
no cross-licenses can be written.  
However, this result holds only if all patent holders are non-integrated
are likely to emerge, are characterized by a mixture of vertically integrated and
firms. If there are also some vertically integrated firms, the equilibrium descri
longer exists. In fact, if there are at least two vertically integrated firms along with
integrated firms, then there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium where al
royalty rates are the same – some asymmetry must persist. To see why this is so
must be the case that the fixed fees extract all the profits from the down
Otherwise, each firm would have an incentive to further raise its fixed fee. B
royalties extract all of the downstream economic profits, then all vertically integ
indifferent whether or not to produce downstream. Suppose that vertically int
further increases its linear royalty rate and/or its fixed fee. The increase does not
i i
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As we saw above, when all downstream firms are vertically integrated, then firms can 
However, they 
firms in order 
 not have this 
m competition because it increases 
e increases their royalty income.   
5. Conclusions 
always charge 
hat if firms set 
ertical double 
ntegrated firm 
also has an incentive to raise its royalties in order to raise its rivals’ costs and to restrict entry on 
the downstream
rm may charge 
ng agreements 
of whether they 
are vertically integrated or not. However, if there are non-integrated downstream firms, vertically 
t them, 
while non-integrated patent holders benefit from more competition and more entry downstream.  
 When both non-integrated and integrated firms hold patents and are able to coordinate 
their royalties, a conflict of interests arises. Non-integrated firms have to make their profits 
upstream, while the vertically integrated firms make some part or even the bulk of their profits on 
deal with the “raising rivals’ costs” effect by writing a cross-licensing agreement. 
nonetheless have an incentive to discriminate against non-integrated downstream 
to jointly monopolize the downstream market. Non-integrated upstream firms do
incentive. To the contrary, they benefit from more downstrea
downstream quantities sold and therefor
Our analysis has shown that the presumption that non-practicing patent holders 
higher royalties than vertically integrated companies is not warranted. It is true t
linear royalties non-cooperatively, a vertically integrated firm will internalize the v
mark-up problem which tends to reduce royalties. On the other hand, a vertically i
 market, especially among non-integrated downstream firms. The overall effect 
on rates is ambiguous. In fact, under some circumstances a vertically integrated fi
higher royalties than its non-integrated counterpart. 
 If firms can coordinate their royalties through patent pools or cross-licensi
they can solve the complements and the double-mark-up problem independently 
integrated firms will nonetheless want to increase royalties in order to discriminate agains
 24
the downstream market. Furthermore, vertically integrated firms may reduce their royalty rates in 
 firms. 
same aggregate 
ments, then non-integrated firms must get higher explicit royalties than the non-
inte
non-integrated 
patent holders always charge higher royalties than vertically integrated companies. Moreover, 
hat the firm is 
e behavior. Rather, non-integrated patent holders naturally require higher 
roya  in kind in the 
In a recent empirical paper Allison, Lemley and Walker  analyse a data set on litigated 
able. A large 
 by invention 
es play a major 
 most litigated 
 been litigated 
only once. They find that the most litigated patents are much more likely to be owned by non-
practicing patent holders. This is consistent with our analysis that suggests that there is more 
lders are involved. Furthermore, in the 
overwhelming majority of cases studied by Allison et al. the patent holders were invention 
specialists. Only 7 percent of all lawsuits involved patent-holders that acquired the patent and did 
                                                
exchange for a cross license payment in kind –– an option not available to upstream
Therefore, if firms want to split profits equally, or if they want to achieve the 
licensing pay
grated firms.  
Our analysis suggests that there is no justification for the presumption that 
even when non-integrated patent holders do charge “higher” royalties than their vertically 
integrated counterparts do, it does not imply that the rates are “excessive” or t
exhibiting troll-lik
lty earnings because they earn no profits downstream and receive no payments
form of cross licenses. 
34
patents. Almost by definition litigated patents are patents that are highly valu
fraction of these patents is owned by non-practicing patent holders, held mainly
specialists and by patent holding companies. This shows that non-practicing entiti
role in the modern patent system. Allison et al. compare the characteristics of the
patents (patents that have been litigated at least eight times) to the patents that have
potential for conflict if non-practicing patent ho
 
34
 John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley and Joshua Walker, EXTREME VALUE OR TROLLS ON TOP? THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
MOST-LITIGATED PATENTS, June 2009, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407796. 
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not invent it themselves. This suggests that court-based discrimination against all non-practicing 
ent incentives of innovation 
spec
ld not depend 
ive” royalties 
estments or weak 
patents. These factors are orthogonal to whether patent holders are vertically integrated or not. 
 
  
patent holders could have severe adverse effects on the investm
ialist who play an important role in advanced market economies.  
We conclude that remedy rules, such as entitlement to injunctive relief, shou
on the plaintiff’s business model status. Whether a company charges “excess
depends on whether there is scope for hold-up, either because of sunk inv
 26
Appendix: Bilateral Cross Licensing 
tent. Firms compete in quantities on the downstream market 
n P b
Consider N vertically integrated firms producing with identical constant marginal production cost 
k. Each firm owns one essential pa
and face a linear inverse demand functio )Q a Q (   . Each pair ( , )i j , ^ `, 1i j
firms agrees to symmetric cross-licensing at rate ij jir r
,..., N , of 
 , where r royalty charged by 
n by i
 ijr is the linea
 i j
j ì
R r
z
 ¦ . firm i  to firm j .  Thus, the total licensing costs of firm i  are give
We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium with the two following properties: 
x Given the licensing cost iR  the firms play a Cournot-Nash equilibrium at the second stage 
. 
int profits by agreeing 
Claim: There is a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in the cross-licensing 
s-licen  rate 
of the linear Cournot game
x There does not exist a pair ( , )i j  of firms that could increase its jo
to a different cross licensing rate. 
game in which all firms agree to charge the same cros sing royalty
2ij
r r
N
  ements the monopoly outcome.  a k . This licensing rate impl
Proof:
2
a 
 Suppose that each pair of firms agreed to the cross licensing rate kr
N
 . Then each 
firm has marginal cost ( 1)(
2
N a k
c k
N
  
m at the second stage of
)
.  It is straightforward to compute the symmetric 
Cournot-Nash equilibriu  the game. In equilibrium each firm produces 
2
a k
q
bN
 , so the total quantity supplied is 
2
a k
Q
b
  which is equal to the monopoly quantity. 
 27
2
a k
P
 , and each firm makes 
2(aThe resulting price is the monopoly price )
4i
k
bN
3   which is 
1/N of the monopoly profit . 
d
e may be positive or negative of these two 
Suppose now that two firms 1 and 2 consider a deviation and charge each other 
(wher ). This deviation changes the marginal costs 
firms to 
12 21r r r   , 
 d
( 2) ( 1)c k N r r d N r d        , while the marginal costs of all other firms remain 
unchanged. We now have to solve for the Cournot Nash equilibrium on the downstream market 
with asymmetric cost functions. Note that downstream profit functions are given by 
i j i
j
a b q k N r d q i
a b q k N r q i N
 
3        
3       
¦
¦
 
The first order conditions for profit maximization are given by 
 
1j
N
 
1
( ( 1) )    if   {1,2}
( ( 1) )    if   {3,..., }
N
i j i
^ `
^ `
( 1) 0   if   
2 ( 1) 0   if   3,...,i j
j ìi
N i
q k N r i N
z
w3    
w3      
 
Symmetry of firms 1 and 2 and firms 3, …, N requires 
2 1,2i i j
j ìi
i
a bq b q k r d
q
a b b q
q
z
    w
 w
¦
¦
1 2q q q   and 3 ... Nq q q   . Solving 
for q , q  and P and plugging in 
2
a k
r
N
  yields: 
 
( 1)( ) 1
( 1) 2 1
( 1) 2 2
( 1) 2 1
( 1) 2 2
1 2
a k N r d a k N
q d
b N Nb N
a k N r d a k d
q
b N Nb N
a Nk rN N d a k d
P
N N
        
       
      
1

 
 
Thus, the profit of firm ^ `1, 2i is given by 
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downstream profit upstream profit
( 1) ( ) ( 2)i P k N r d q r d q N rq3          '****(****) '***(***)   
q  and q  yields  Substituting P, r, 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
4 2 2 2 2 8
4 ( 1) 
( 1)akN a k a a k k aN N N k aN k
N N
N d N
b
N          
  
Differentiating with respect to d we get: 
i3  
 
16 ( 1) 4
4 ( 1)
i dN N d
d bN N
w3
b
   w   
Note that this profit function is globally concave and maximized at d=0. Thus, no pair of firms 
has an incentive to deviate and to change its bilateral royalty rate.  Q.E.D. 
 
  
 
